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Abstract: Whereas the impact of Brexit on Anglophone Africa was a major issue in the 
controversial British discussions on the pros and cons of Brexit, possible repercussions on 
French-speaking Africa have been rarely mentioned up to now. If at all, mostly indirect general 
effects were declared, both concerning the former British Empire in Africa and a fortifori for the 
former French colonies as well. Yet, the range of possible Brexit effect is impressive. It spreads 
from direct influence on farm-gate cocoa-prices in the CFA-currency regions and subsequent 
percussions on the state budget of these countries, over more indirect effects, e.g. on the 
cooperation between CEMAC, WAEMU and the EU concerning EDF-programs of which Great 
Britain has been a major contributor so far, as well as enforced re-negotiation of controversial 
EPAs, to the revival of progressive social networks in Francophone Africa. The latter are already 
demanding more political and economic sovereignty, for example with respect to the 
increasingly anachronistic F CFA currency. Yet, in view of the lack of countervailing power of 
Britain within the EU in the case of Brexit, the murky network of Françafrique could be re-
vitalized and consolidated as well. This impacts also on the revival of the long-standing 
controversy on the ill-adapted and increasingly anachronistic F CFA. Last, but not least, British 
application for EU membership had been vetoed two times by France in 1963 and November 
1967. Arguably, this veto has direct links to the British Brexit vote of 2016. African activists 
already demand a genuine African debate and a referendum on these issues similar to the 
Brexit vote. More generally, the Brexit will also impact negatively on acquired ethics concerning 
popular participation, both in Europe and in Africa.  
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1. Introduction – General Implications of Brexit for Francophone Africa  
 
Whereas the impact of Brexit on Anglophone Africa was a major issue in the controversial 
British discussions on the pros and cons of Brexit (Kohnert, 2018), possible repercussions on 
French-speaking Africa have been rarely mentioned up to now (Douet, 2019, Togo-First, 
2019). According to a study by UNCTAD (UNCTAD), published on April 9, 2019, the effects 
will be far from uniform. The most developed African countries with a diversified industry, 
such as South Africa, should be better off (+ 39% of exports to the United Kingdom, 
compared to 2018 in the case of no deal, i.e. +3 bn US or € 2.67 billion). On the other hand, 
Ghana (-39% or US $ 91m) and Cameroon (-28% or US $ 17m) would be the biggest losers 
(Douet, 2019). If at all, mostly indirect general effects were declared, both concerning the 
former British Empire in Africa and a fortifori for the former French colonies as well. At least, 
this was asserted by Albert Zeufack, World Bank Chief Economist for West Africa, during a 
talk at the Chamber of Commerce of Côte d’Ivoire (CCI) on 29 June 2016 (Zeufack, 2016).  
 
On the other hand, British Brexiteers were not tired of yearning for the re-establishment of 
the glory times of British Empire, conceivably based on a euphoric and over-ambitious multi-
expert report of the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, financed by the Royal Africa 
Society, on the post-Brexit Africa-UK trade and development cooperation relations (RAS-
APPG-2017; Kohnert, 2018; 2018a). This the more so because the United Kingdom (UK) 
nowadays has already important economic relations with Angola, Ivory Coast and Senegal. 
Other members of the French pré carée in Africa, like Togo, want to enter the African 
Commonwealth too (RFI, 2016). According to Zeufack, the direct effects of the British exit 
from the European Union (EU) will be "negligible" for Africa while the indirect effects could be 
important. This, notably if Brexit would cause a slowdown in growth in the EU, with 
repercussions on African countries, their main partner is Europe. Indirect effects may seem 
especially noticeable at the level of international financing. One of the immediate 
consequences of Brexit would be to make international liquidity more expensive and less 
available. This could affect for instance those African countries that would like to raise funds 
on international markets, e.g. to finance their infrastructure. Moreover, the indirect effects 
could include lessons for regional integration that African states could draw from Brexit. This 
was confirmed implicitly during the African Union (AU) summit in Kigali in March 2018. The 
African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), approved by 44 African governments in Kigali 
envisages using their negotiating advantage as in-demand partners to press for more 
protection of their domestic markets and infant industries (Westcott 2018). Moreover, it could 
offer solutions concerning long-standing problems of economic integration, as the 
anachronistic multitude of eight currencies competing in West Africa, which is a real 
handicap for the economic performance of the region.  
 
Britain’s and France’s rivalry for supremacy in (post-)colonial Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) has a 
long and conflictual history, notably in West Africa (Wesseling, 2004). Although the chasse 
gardée of the so-called Françafrique (Verschave, 1999; 2005; Boisbouvier, 2010, Haski, 
2013), sustained by the post-colonial system of the Messieurs Afrique (Kohnert, 2005; Glaser 
& Smith, 1992;1997), has been out-matched by British dominance in Africa up-to-date, it is 
still very much alive. The term Françafrique, originally coined by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, 
first president of Ivory Coast in 1960, used to describe the post-colonial relationship between 
France and its former colonies. France wanted to continue, by all means, legal or not, to 
control its former African colonies. This clandestine system of self-interested parallel French 
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foreign policy founded in the late 1950s was led by men in the shadows under the watchful 
eye of Jacques Foccart, the "Mr Africa" of the Elysee until his death in 1997. It was an 
integrated political, military, economic and financial system of venality in SSA by which 
French and African political and business elites scratched each other’s backs at the expense 
of their fellow citizens. Its walling-off by a special currency, the CFA franc, assured restricted 
competition and extraordinary gains for all parties involved (Kohnert, 1994). The biggest 
losers in the WAEMU (UEMOA), were Niger, Togo, and Burkina Faso. In the BEAC zone 
(CEMAC), Cameroon was the biggest loser. Empirical evidence showed that there were 
more losers than gainers in the CFA Franc monetary cooperation system (M'Bet & Niamkey, 
1994). 
 
Map 1: Colonial origins of Francophone Africa  
 
   
Source: Celmar Etienne (2010): Françafrique: la belle époque...  
Marcel Thiriet.blogspot.com  
 
Thus, post-colonial dependence continued in other forms, including the looting of raw 
materials, with the complicity of corrupt African heads of state, sometimes maintained at 
great expense, but also aware of their power over the former metropolis (Airault & Bat, 
2016). Examples are the escapades of infamous  "emperor" Bokassa of the Central African 
Republic, or the pillage of the resources of their countries over decades by late Omar Bongo 
(Gabun, succeeded after his death in 2009 by his son Ali Bongo) and general Eyadéma 
Ganssingbé of Togo, continued by the heir to his throne, Faure Gnassingbé up to date 
(Kohnert, 2019).  
 
All this, despite repeated announcements of French presidents, form Nicolas Sarkozy, over  
François Hollande to Emmanuel Macron, of the departure from its established policy of 
Françafrique since the controversial Dakar-declaration of Sarkozy in 2007. Some experts 
even stated a degeneration of Françafrique to a mafia-like network of high ranking French 
and African politicians and businessmen (Verschave, 2005; Mbembe, 2010; Cailletet & Milot, 
2010; Thorel, 2013).  
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In view of the lack of countervailing power of Britain within the EU in the case of Brexit, it is 
not to be excluded that the murky network of Françafrique or alternative shadily trans-
boundary networks of corruption, trafficking and money-laundering in Francophone Africa, 
notably in the resource rich countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, could even be 
re-vitalized and consolidated. The current Bolloré-affair, probed by the French justice in 
connection with the notorious French tycoon Vincent Bolloré and his network of corruption in 
collusion with African autocrats in French West-Africa, could be an indicator of things to 
happen 3. 
 
Map 2: French military intervention in Sub-Sahara Africa  
 
 
Source: Celmar Etienne (2010): Françafrique: la belle époque...  
Marcel Thiriet.blogspot.com © WaG-Reuters  
 
British-African relations, on the contrary, are said to have been less ideologically charged 
than that of France, with the possible exception of its former settler colony Zimbabwe 
(Haefliger, 2019). In this respect, a look into the history of EU-African relations could be 
useful.  
 
The creation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) as a privileged 
partner of the EU, for example, was a direct result of Britain’s accession to the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, i.e. 22 years after the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and 15 years of the formation of the EEC, the two 
predecessors of the EU. British application for EU membership had been vetoed two times 
by France in 1963 and November 1967. Arguably, this veto has direct links to the British 
Brexit vote of 2016 (Goldsmith & Farrell, 2017).  
                                                 
3Yet, others caution about the end of the glory days of Françafrique (Pilling, 2019). Nevertheless, the shadowy 
Françafrique network has aroused continuing attention and was only recently even aptly characterized by a 
graphic novel written by Harel & Sole (2018): L'Argent fou de la Françafrique: L'Affaire des biens mal-acquis. 
Paris: Glénat BD. Reviewed in Le Monde Afrique, by Mollon, Fabien (2018). 
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The then French president Charles de Gaulle had favoured an European Community 
dominated by France and steered by a Franco-German alliance (Troitiño, 2018: 89; 
Connolly, 2017; Goldsmith & Farrell, 2017). Moreover, he suspected the UK to effectively act 
as America’s agent inside the European Common Market. He was afraid that the UK would 
promote a free trade agreement with the USA and Canada inside the Community which was 
unacceptable to him, because this would lead to economic domination of the EU by the USA 
(Troitiño, 2018: 89-90). London, on the other hand, wanted to preserve the UK’s privileged 
economic and monetary relations with the Commonwealth countries, including the imperial 
preference system (Deschamps, 2017). France’s interest in EU-relations with Africa were 
based on the need to finance the external influence of France in African via the EU, 
something it could not afford alone in the context of the Cold War politics (Chochia, 2018:69). 
Further on, in cannot be ruled out that France did not want an undue competitor in its post-
colonial dealings with Africa at a time, when Francophone Africa was one of the few 
remaining bargaining chips in its struggle for imperial might after having lost its colonies in 
Indochina.  
 
The formation of the ACP resulted in the Lomé Convention, signed in 1975 between the EEC 
and 46 ACP countries. The adherence to the EEC offered the UK the chance to both 
collectivize its obligations to some of these ACP-states at the expense of the other European 
member states, while at the same time opening news prospects in Francophone Africa, 
which had previously been beyond its reach (Price, 2018). The UK Government itself stated 
in 2013 that through the collectivization of aid provision in the EU, the ‘reach and magnitude 
of EU financial instruments' (which includes the EDF) ‘outweighs those the UK could bring to 
bear bilaterally'. This allowed the UK to maximize the use of its resources, allowing it in times 
of austerity to focus ‘scarce national resources on priorities elsewhere' (UK Government, 
2013; Price, 2018). Already in 1958, the Rome Treaty had installed a close alliance between 
the EEC and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) of its founding member states, 
including a preferential trade regime as well as financial assistance through the first 
European Development Fund (EDF). France had been at that time the prominent driver of 
this association set up in order to push its particular political and economic interests in Africa 
(Kennes, 2018).  
 
However, Africa especially was also a way for conservative British politicians to maintain 
global influence. Thus, most recently, Theresa May’s Africa-tour to the African heavy-
weights, South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria at the end of August 2018, was meant to 
consolidate and deepen economic ties between the UK and the African Commonwealth 
(Jennings, 2018). British companies control large areas of African land enclosing key mineral 
reserves including gold, copper, platinum, coal, and diamonds (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; 
Kabemba 2014). About 100 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) - most of 
them British - have mining operations in 37 SSA countries. They collectively control over US 
$1 trillion worth of Africa’s most valuable resources (Curtis 2016). British companies could be 
inclined to negotiate in the future independently of perceived or real EU ethical restrictions 
which would allow these inequalities to aggravate even more (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016: 3).  
 
However, Britain’s competitiveness decreased substantially within the past decades, from  
7% to 2% of Africa’s imports. British trade with Africa is dominated by fuel, precious stones 
and fresh fruit that suffered, last but not least as a consequence of falling commodity prices. 
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By comparison, trade with the EU is dominated by machinery and vehicles, either as finished 
goods or as parts and components.” (Romei & Cocco, 2018). France, Germany and Italy 
export more than double the value of goods to Africa than the UK. Even Spain, which has an 
economy half the size of the UK’s, exports more than Britain (Romei&Cocco, 2018).  
 
 
Source: Romei & Cocco, 2018 
 
 
-     
Source: Romei & Cocco, 2018 
 
On the other hand, in the case of Brexit, French self-centred dominance of EU-Africa policies 
would reign unrestricted of British countervailing powers. Despite the UK rarely being a 
constructive player in the European integration process, it has played an important role in 
counter-balancing the power of Germany and France. Thus, some experts see already 
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positive developments caused by Brexit for countries like Libya and Zimbabwe, hitherto 
under EU sanctions supported by Britain. With Brexit, the EU-27 – motivated by France and 
Germany - might be encouraged to review these sanctions and possibly re-engage with 
these countries (Tan, 2018). The ability of small EU member states to have a say on the joint 
decision-making of the Franco-German axis will depend on the strength of EU institutions in 
continuing to balance the interests of all members, and the collaborative working of small 
states to influence decisions taken within them (Bishop & Clegg, 2018).  
 
But Africa could also be looking for other partners if its ties with the UK and the EU-27 get 
complicated because of Brexit, according to the saying when two people quarrel the third one 
rejoices. In the past decade, China already out-manoeuvred the EU and became SSA most 
important export partner by 2013, accounting for 27% of the region’s exports, compared with 
only 23% for the EU, and 21% of the USA (Tan, 2018). Moreover, Chinese goods exports to 
Africa are eight times larger than those of the UK and even bigger than the top three 
exporters, Germany, France and the US,  combined (Romei & Cocco, 2018).  
 
 
2. The impact of Brexit on the new scramble for Africa and the ‘second liberation’ 
of Francophone Africa 
 
According to not a small number of ‘influencers' of French-speaking social networks, like the 
Franco-Cameroonian female cartoonist Annick Kamgang (2016), the Brexit could also inspire 
Africa in re-launching a debate on its sovereignty, including judicial and monetary issues. 
Brexit could thus be used as a cause for a ‘second liberation of Africa’ from (post)- colonial 
domination. One prominent case in the realm of the judiciary is the controversy in African 
Media on supposedly biased rulings on African leaders by the International Criminal Court, 
The Hague. The trial of the former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré (1982-1990) was a case 
in point. Yet, his conviction by the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC), which sentenced 
Hissène Habré to life imprisonment in 2015, showed that Africans themselves were able to 
judge their former leaders. The same holds for Rwanda’s legal system that accused France 
of complicity in the 1994 genocide. Paris and Kigali are still trying to settle their legal 
disputes.  
Another, even more important issue in the realm of economics of Francophone Africa is the 
long-standing controversy on the ill-adapted and increasingly anachronistic F CFA franc 
(Kohnert, 2005; 1994). Kampgang and others ask, when will there be a genuine African 
debate and a referendum on these issues similar to the Brexit vote?  
In fact, the debate began already. In October 2016, a group of African and European 
economists published a book entitled Liberate Africa from Monetary Slavery: Who Profits 
from the CFA Franc? (Nubukpo et al, 2016, in French). In the wake of the public debate 
sparked by this and similar publications (see also: Pigeaud et al, 2018), people began to 
speak out (Sylla, 2018). They were assisted by internationally renowned (former) African 
officials and critics of the F CFA franc, including Togo’s Kako Nubukpo (ex-BCEAO and 
former Togolese Minister), Senegal’s Sanou Mbaye (ex-African Development Bank, and 
Guinea-Bissau’s Carlos Lopez (ex-UN Economic Commission for Africa), as well as African 
bankers like Henri-Claude Oyima (President-Director General of BGFI Bank).  
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Graph 1: The Franc CFA zones (WAEMU/UEMOA & CEMAC) in 2017  
  
Source: ‘La Zone fanc en 2017’. Banque de France 
 
Since some years, a social movement developed to demand the withdrawal of African states 
from the F CFA. On 7 January 2017, for example, an NGO set up and run by the activist 
Kemi Séba, backed by ‘SOS Pan-Africa’, anti-CFA demonstrations were organized in several 
African and European cities (Sylla, 2018). In Senegal, the France Dégage group has been 
campaigning for the "monetary sovereignty" of the CFA countries (Lottersberger, 2018). 
However, the Senegalese economist Ndongo Samba Sylla deplored that the debate over the 
CFA franc has been too often restricted to the general pros and cons, because in reality, 
these are extremely unevenly distributed between social strata. The F CFA benefits mainly a 
small political and economic elite, both in France and Francophone Africa, as well as the 
managers of central banks and French companies (Lottersberger, 2018). Increasing support 
by the general public in the African countries concerned was revealed recently by a survey of 
Afrobarometer, published on 7 February 2019. The survey revealed that two thirds of the 
Togolese population are in favour of leaving the F CFA because the currency would benefit 
France more than Togo and should be replaced (Akinocho, 2019). In the meantime, a task 
force for an exit by 2020 has been established, even though a majority of heads of state of 
WAEMU continue to give their support to the CFA franc (Akinocho, 2019). Yet, former 
Togolese Minister Kako Nubukpo, got disposed from his position as Director of the 
Francophonie in 2017 because of his opposition to the CFA franc.  
Closely related with the question of independent monetary policy is the question of the 
impact of Brexit on African stock markets. Whereas some experts consider Brexit as stimulus 
For African growth, including liberating effect on stock markets (Bush, 2018). They are part 
and parcel of the CFA Zone. Apart from 29 stock exchanges in Africa, representing 38 
nations' capital markets there are two regional exchanges, the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs 
9 
 
Mobilières (BRVM), in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, and the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs 
Mobilières d'Afrique Centrale (BVMAC), in Libreville, Gabon. These stock exchanges are still 
relatively small with limited companies listed. However, according to Bush, they would benefit 
dramatically if the shares are listed in a common currency which will allow cross-border 
capitalisations of African companies and projects. The BCEAO itself sounds less optimistic. 
In its monthly economic report for the UEMOA countries for November 2018 it cautioned 
about continued slow-down of economic activity in 2019 because of Brexit (BCEAO, 2019). 
 
According to Alain Nkoyock, head of the Modeling and Technological Innovations Program in 
the United Nations for the fight against corruption and financial crime, holds that two lessons 
could be drawn from Brexit by pan-Africanists: The first lesson focuses on the 
intergenerational irresponsibility and inequity, as consequences of a crisis of political 
leadership in the EU. The second lesson concerns the age-old question of the limits of supra-
nationality that occupied the minds of pan-African politicians already in the early days of 
independence. The controversy between Leopold Senghor's group of Monrovia and the 
partisans of federalism (Casablanca group), led by Kwame Nkrumah, resulted in the defeat 
of the pan-African idea and the victory of the vision of an “Africa of States ". According to 
Nkoyock (2016), “Brexit makes it possible to understand that the analysis of the nature of the 
Union through the prism of the Pan-African State necessarily involves the study of 
competences (foreign policy, common security or monetary policy) and institutional 
structures”. Because African and British security are inextricably linked, according to Prime 
Minister May, she promised rising post-Brexit UK presence in Chad, Niger and Mali 
concerning security matters. Therefore, the Francophone Sahel will become increasingly 
important also for military cooperation between the UK and the EU (Gaynor, 2018). Thus the 
Francophone Sahel will be increasingly important also for military cooperation between the 
UK and the EU. In general, the Brexit will offer Francophone Africa too the chance of 
renewed negotiations both between the UK and Africa and as well between Africa and the 
remaining EU-27. In short, there will be change, but it will be long, negotiations will span over 
years to come. 
Besides, there could be also more direct effects of the Brexit. For example, the Ivorian Prime 
Minister, Amadou Gon Coulibaly, cautioned about possible unintended consequences of 
Brexit on West African coca-farmers (Wheatley, 2017). Thus, any fall in the value of the 
Pound Sterling against the Euro once Britain leaves the EU would have damaging 
consequences for Ivorian public finances because cocoa is priced in Sterling and the CFA 
franc in West Africa is linked to the Euro. So when the pound falls it is a loss for the Ivory 
Coast. The development of the cocoa price in recent years fell already sharply since the 
Brexit vote of 2016, with the effect that also the value of Ivorian cocoa sales dropped. This 
provided a small foretaste of what else could be in the pipeline. Thus, Prime Minister 
Coulibaly explained: “Ivory Coast produced an estimated 1.98m tonnes in 2016/17, or about 
40 per cent of the world total, according to the International Cocoa Organization. But export 
prices fell 35 per cent between late 2016 and the first quarter of this year, hitting the 
economy and contributing to a budget deficit that is forecast to widen to 4.5 per cent of 
GDP.” (Wheatley, 2017). Therefore, the former Ivorian Minister of Commerce Jean-Louis 
Billon maintained that it would become necessary to make the Ivorian currency independent 
and convertible to guarantee the country’s stability in trade. According to him, the farm-gate 
price of CFAF 700 / kg set for the 2017-2018 cocoa season was already not accepted by the 
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producers and concluded: “If another price reduction were to occur because of Brexit, it 
would be a real disaster for the industry that is going through an area of turbulence” (Dreyfus 
polichinelle, 2017). 
On the other hand, Brexit could offer also new opportunities in the long-run by allowing the 
Ivory Coast to restructure and improve its trade agreements. The UK is the fourth consumer 
of chocolate worldwide. Up to now, it imported most of its cacao products from the EU. If 
after Brexit the UK would impose duties on EU imports, it could mean that the price of 
chocolate will increase. Therefore, it would be stupid for Ivory Coast not to focus on 
establishing better relations with the UK (Intellivoire, 2016). This the more so, because the 
controversial Economic Partnership Arrangements (EPAs) of the EU oblige West Africa to 
open about 80% of its market for imports in exchange for royalty-free access to the European 
market for African products which constitutes a one-sided advantage for the EU and could 
undermine local industrialization efforts (Intellivoire, 2016; Kohnert, 2015).  
In general, the biggest impact post-Brexit on Africa would probably be in the area of 
investment. UK investment in Africa steadily increased, doubling between 2005 and 2014, 
and currently standing at approximately £43 billion (Gaynor, 2018). In 2018, the UK-
government promised a further increase by £8 billion, including partnership programs 
between African companies and the City of London for mentoring and technical assistance. 
However, whether all Francophone countries in Africa would benefit from these investments 
is open to question. Cameroon and other French-speaking countries such as Chad and Ivory 
Coast, where the UK holds important investments, have to bother in the event of Brexit as 
well (Anadolu Agency, 2016). As a direct result of Brexit, UK investments in these countries 
could fall, be interrupted or to a lesser extent renegotiated, as they were concluded under the 
French influence of the EU. This would apply for example to Chad, where Great Britain is the 
third largest investor (after China and France) in the infrastructure and exploration of oil sites 
and to Niger and its uranium. Cameroon, with its oil sites, including many that are exploited 
by the British, will probably have to pay, too, a heavy toll because of Brexit, estimates the 
Chadian economist Abdel Mamout (Anadolu Agency, 2016).  
As for the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), including 
Cameroon, first lessons can already be drawn from a future Brexit according to Cemac 
Commission Vice-President Rosario Mbasogo Kung Nguidang (Andzongo, Sylvain, 2016). 
Cooperation between CEMAC and the EU could be impacted for example at the level of 
NIPs [National Indicative Program] and NIRs [Regional Indicative Program] of the European 
Development Fund (EDF) of which Great Britain is a major contributor. Also, the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) would have to be re-negotiated between the EU and Central 
Africa (as for the rest of Africa). The NIPs and NIRs are the EDF compass, the main 
instrument of EU aid. As a reminder, the exports of the CEMAC countries to Britain in 2015, 
represented € 355.098 m, and imports € 594.625 m (Andzongo, Sylvain, 2016). 
As for the impact of Brexit on Senegal, 7.9% of imports and 5.5% of total EU-28 exports with 
Senegal were made by the United Kingdom (UK) (Berthelot, 2016). Yet, Senegal should not 
suffer large losses of customs duties (DD) in the event of Brexit because it is likely that the 
UK will maintain the EU's ‘Everything but arms' status for all LDCs, including the AU, 
although it will tend to privilege commercial relations and external assistance with English-
speaking countries. 
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Last, but not least, Brexit shall impact on migrants from French-speaking African countries 
living in the UK, including the tricky question of remittances. Remittances have been the 
largest source of international financial flows to Africa since 2010, accounting on average for 
about a third of total external financial inflows, and three times as much as development aid, 
according to the World Bank. They represent the most stable source of flows (AEO, 2018). 
The UK has a large migrant population, in fact, it is the 10th largest source of remittances 
worldwide. The fall in the value of the pound will have an adverse effect on these (Gaynor, 
2018). Moreover, British post-Bresit migration policy will never be as liberal as before. Prime 
Minister May repeatedly committed herself to tackling illegal migration, going as far as to 
propose an end to free movement “once and for all”, allowing only highly skilled migrants into 
the UK. Many countries who are heavily reliant on remittances, e.g. Senegal where 14 %t of 
its GDP comes from remittances, are likely to suffer (Gaynor, 2018). 
An example is the relatively new, but already considerable Congolese diaspora in Britain that 
had been attracted by steady growth, a stable currency and high living standards in the past 
decades. Many of them came via other EU countries like France, Belgium, Germany, 
Sweden and Greece. Although the Congolese community is also structured along social 
status, they are said to be less "tribal" than other Africans living in the UK, like the 
Zimbabweans, Nigerians or natives of Congo Brazzaville (Badila, 2019). When it is said that 
their national identity is more important than their "tribal" affiliation that is to say that 
Congolese migrant developed stronger networks between fellow communities in the EU like 
Belgium and France, two countries frequently visited by Congolese migrants living in the UK, 
where also a large population of the Congolese community are concentrated. For them, 
Brexit would mean that Congolese would probably be forced to obtain a visa to travel or work 
in the rest of the EU-27 countries. The British government could even impose restrictions on 
their work permit and residence card (Badila, 2019).  
 
 
3. Conclusion  
Contrary to a widespread opinion, available evidence suggests that the Brexit will impact 
considerably not only on the English speaking African Commonwealth but on Francophone 
Africa too. The range of possible effect is impressive. It spreads from direct influence on 
farm-gate cocoa-prices in the CFA-currency regions and subsequent percussions on the 
state budget of these countries, over more indirect effects, e.g. on the cooperation between 
CEMAC, WAEMU and the EU concerning EDF-programs of which Great Britain has been a 
major contributor so far, as well as enforced re-negotiation of controversial EPAs, up to the 
point of the revival of progressive social networks in Francophone Africa. The latter are 
already demanding more political and economic sovereignty, for example with respect to the 
increasingly anachronistic F CFA currency. Moreover, the remix of cards caused by Brexit 
could offer new chances, both for those Francophone governments that flirt with the idea of 
joining the African Commonwealth and the ‘remainers’ in Francophone Africa, to use old-
established see-saw policy of cold-war times. This would allow for renewed negotiations 
between African governments on the one side and the UK, EU and other global players in 
the run for African resources and markets, like China, India, Brazil and Turkey on the other, 
in order to open up new doors for increasing economic and political power.  
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More generally, the Brexit and its spread-effects could also impact negatively on acquired 
human rights concerning popular participation, both in Europe and in Africa. This is because 
the elite-driven process of European integration has been enhanced and developed over 
decades by granting a greater political role to ordinary citizens by reaching mutually 
acceptable agreements that balance their various communitarian commitments in ways that 
reflect a cosmopolitan regard for fairness (Bellamy & Warleigh, 1998: 447-448; Brown, 1994; 
Nunes, 2011). This right of participation goes far beyond the politics and economics of Brexit. 
It includes also the ethics of participation which are on the long run even more important for 
the cohesion of the union than political and economic motives. Thus, the withdrawal of the 
UK will have hitherto widely disregarded implications for shared ethics (Frost, 2019). In fact, 
the Brexit constitutes a retrograde step in promoting a political and socio-cultural climate 
which could in the worst case become similar to that of Apartheid South Africa. For example, 
in policing borders and forming a reserve-pool of migrant labourers which can be admitted or 
not, depending on the ‘national interest’, thus depriving this globalized ‘lumpen-proletariat’ of 
basic individual civilian rights, declassifying it in terms of racist, religious and gender and 
denying basic rules of the global free market of goods to human beings (Frost, 2019:192-96). 
The ultimate outcome of all this might very well include severe conflicts within the state and 
between states when radical right-wing nationalist start to defend their perceived legitimate 
interest with violent means, including neo-fascist militias like in pre-war Europe in the 1920th. 
The backlash will not be a long time coming. Activists among the segregated ‘foreigners’ and 
‘infidels’ will turn to asymmetrical warfare, labelled as ‘terrorism’ by the populist majority 
(Frost, 2019:197). 
 
On the other hand, the revival of already written-off murky socio-political networks like that of 
Françafrique or alternative new networks of transboundary corruption, trafficking and money-
laundering in view of lacking British counter-balance within the EU to the detriment of the 
ordinary tax-payer cannot be ruled out either. The lesson of frustrated high-flying hopes for 
increased grass-roots political democratization in the wake of the ‘second wind of liberation', 
stimulated by the Sovereign National Conferences in Francophone Africa in the early 1990s 
(Robinson, 1994), may alert for prudence in the prevision of enhanced political participation 
in Francophone Africa and elsewhere. Increasing nationalism and populism, stoked by 
mounting migration-pressure all over SSA, including dire effects on the EU, as confirmed 
during the most recent 32. AU summit in Addis Ababa (11 February 2019) focusing on 
refugees and migration (UN-SA, 2019; DW, 2019), would be another option. This, not only 
for African autocrats, despite all rhetoric about fresh initiatives for ‘economic pan-Africanism’ 
by the new chairperson of the African Union, the Egyptian president Abdel Fatta el-Sissi, and 
the acceleration of intra-African trade by the African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), 
launched one year before under his predecessor, Paul Kagame, that has been signed by 
some 50 countries, but ratified up to now only by 22 others.  
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